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Abstract: Standard economic models are based on an axiom set that epitomizes the 
fundamental behavioral assumptions. The present treatise moves these assumptions from 
the foreground to the background. The suggested change of perspective is guided by the 
question: what is the minimum set of foundational propositions for a consistent 
reconstruction of the evolving money economy? We start with four non-behavioral 
axioms. Subsequently their logical and factual implications are explored and the building 
blocks of the general axiomatic model are determined. The switch of the unifying 
principle resolves the profit conundrum – 'one of the most convoluted and muddled areas 
in economy theory'. Hence structural axiomatization has ramifications on larger parts of 
standard economics. By virtue of the axiom set evolution supersedes equilibrium as 
central organizing idea. 
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But it was a second and more important quality that struck readers of the 
head of Book I stand the famous 
day, it was this deductive, mathematical aspect that was the great achievement.
quoted in (Schmiechen, 2009 p. 213)
Walras’s early reading consolidated his boundless admiration for Newtonian astronomy 
and the solid edifice of classical mechanics, which he regarded as unequaled models of
scientific knowledge throughout his life. 
In political economy, Ricardo and James Mill compared the certainty of the propositions 
they were advancing to the certainty of the propositions of 
The impression that one could build price theory up from basics in the image of Euclid 
was much more important than commitment to any particular proposed formalization. 
(Mirowski, 2004 pp. 348-349)
 
xiv 
Principia
Axioms, or the Laws of motion: … For readers of that 
 
(Ingrao, et al., 1990 p. 88) 
Euclid. (Halévy, 1960 p. 494)
 
 
. At the 
 Truesdell, 
 
 
1 
 
Mathematical form powerfully contributes to defining 
a philosophy of economic analysis whose major 
tenets include rigor, generality and simplicity. 
                                                              Gérard Debreu 
Those who take the foundations of their speculations 
from hypotheses, even if they then proceed most 
rigorously according to mechanical laws, are merely 
putting together a romance, elegant perhaps and 
charming, but nevertheless a romance.  Roger Cotes, 
Preface to the second edition of Newton’s Principia 
My way is to begin with the beginning.     Lord Byron 
 
 
1 Euclid’s Rigorous Disciples 
1.1 The Framework of Concepts 
Criticism of the standard economic research program relates to its theoretical, empirical, 
methodological, and political aspects. Part of the pleas amounts to not much more than 'a 
bombardment of soap bubbles' (Hahn, 1984 p. 78). Though, if it is acknowledged that the 
serious scholars’ central objections are valid, and if it is acknowledged on the other hand 
that the conclusions of standard economics are formally correct, unsatisfactory results 
must – modus tollens − be due to the basic assumptions. 
It would be uneconomical to challenge any of these assumptions here in any detail. This 
has been done at length in the literature and the results are common knowledge1, 
Moreover, as Blaug has noted: 
The moral of the story is simply this: it takes a new theory, and not just the 
destructive exposure of assumptions or the collection of new facts, to beat an old 
theory. (Blaug, 1998 p. 703) 
At present standard economics is not firmly enough based on positive knowledge of 
economically relevant human behavior. As Binmore recapitulates: 
I do not understand why we cannot just accept that the empirical evidence shows 
that traditional economics works well in some situations and not at all in others – 
and that the interesting cases for current research all lie somewhere in between. 
(Binmore, 2008 p. 249); see also (Kahneman, 1996), (Sugden, 1991), (Stiglitz, 
1991)2 
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This contingency, though, begs the underlying methodological question whether 
behavioral hypotheses per se are capable of supporting a sophisticated formal 
superstructure that corresponds reasonably well with real world phenomena. As 
Rosenberg resumes: 
The notion that microeconomics is a branch of applied mathematics does 
economists more credit than several possible alternative explanations for its 
empirical weakness. (…) It isolates the limitations of the theory in a factual 
supposition about the determinants of human behavior, one that economists share 
with all of us. But the supposition we all share is false, and so economics rests on a 
purely contingent, though nevertheless central, mistaken belief (…). (Rosenberg, 
1992 p. 247) 
For the moment there is no need to take sides in the discussion of the status of the folk 
psychology (Hands, 1993 pp. 171-183) that underlies standard behavioral assumptions 
because: 
The failure of microeconomic theory to uncover laws of human behavior is due to 
its wrongly assuming that these laws will trade in desires, beliefs or their cognates. 
And the system of propositions about markets and economies that economist have 
constructed on the basis of its assumptions about human behavior is deprived of 
improving explanatory and predictive power because its assumptions cannot be 
improved in a way that transmits improved precision to their consequences. 
(Rosenberg, 1994a p. 224) 
If one shares the outlook that 'anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly' (Hahn, 
1981 p. 1036) then the cognitive investment decision between standard economics and 
the exploration of alternative approaches is a straightforward one3. The present treatise 
makes the attempt to reconstruct a coherent formal superstructure on a non-behavioral 
foundation. When the market economy is conceived as a complex maze of structural and 
behavioral interdependencies then the probability of eventually finding some strong 
regularity is greater in the structural than in the behavioral domain. And since the 
individual 'neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is 
promoting it' (Smith, 2008/1776 pp. 291-292) there is a sizeable a priori probability that 
the beneficial operations of the invisible hand will have the character of structural 
interdependencies, which of course are not apparent to the naked eye but have to be 
abstracted from readily accessible phenomena on the surface. This analytical venture 
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requires a unique coordinate system of primitive concepts to start with. This framework 
of concepts is formalized by a set of axioms4. 
Axiomatization is, again, a serious issue in economics since von Neumann, Debreu, 
Arrow and Hahn (Mirowski, 2002 pp. 104-113, 303, 408-409), (Weintraub, 1998), 
(Leonhard, 1995 pp. 755-756), (Ingrao, et al., 1990) and it is supposed to guarantee the 
coherence and consistency of all parts of a theoretical edifice. Axiomatization alone, 
however, leads merely to 'rigorous rubbish' (Clower, 1994 p. 409) if the first principles 
that govern the subject matter are not accurately identified. Hence axiomatization is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for any theoretical approach concerned with the 
complex real and nominal interdependencies of the evolving economic system and their 
eventual outcomes. It is important to recognize that axiomatization is neither an entirely 
neutral nor an infallible vehicle for abstract thought but may just as well produce 
unintended or unexpected side effects (Mirowski, 1986 pp. 179-204). 
For a comprehensive perspective it is worth to recall that in 1677 Spinoza demonstrated 
his Ethics 'ordine geometrico’ that is, by applying the axiomatic method, and proved the 
existence of God. Why could this proof not attain the same status of impeccability as 
Euclid’s proofs, as was certainly intended? After all, as Peirce observed, 'metaphysics has 
always been the ape of mathematics'. 
It is a well-known jest that 'a mathematician is a scientist who knows neither what he is 
talking about nor whether whatever he is talking about exists or not' (Cartan, quoted in 
(Ronan, 2006 p. 70); see also (Kline, 1982 p. 251)). What Spinoza apparently could not 
discern is that proofs cannot prove the existence of anything beyond the confines of the 
chosen formal system. The fact that products of deductive reasoning correspond in 
numerous cases admirably to the objects and processes of reality has puzzled scientists 
and philosophers since the Greeks (Kline, 1982 pp. 328-354). Spinoza, counting on what 
Wigner (1979 pp. 222-237) much later called the 'unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics' ventured a pioneer transplant of the axiomatic method into a quite different 
body of knowledge. It did not work in his case but it worked ten years later with an 
achievement rare in the history of science. In 1687 Newton made his Principia known to 
the world, laying out the axiomatic groundwork for most of classical mechanics in the 
next centuries (1999/1687 pp. 416-430). The two unlike disciples of Euclid were followed 
by J. S. Mill5: 
4 
 
In the definition which we have attempted to frame of the science of Political 
Economy, we have characterized it as essentially an abstract science, and its 
method as the method à priori. Such is undoubtedly its character as it has been 
understood and taught by all its most distinguished teachers. It reasons, and, as we 
contend, must necessarily reason, from assumptions, not from facts. It is built upon 
hypotheses, strictly analogous to those which, under the name of definitions, are the 
foundations of other abstract sciences. (Mill, 2004/1844 p. 110), original emphasis; 
for an elaborate account of Mill’s method see (Hausman, 2001) 
And without undue delay Mill states the fundamental behavioral principle: 
Just in the same manner [as geometry] does Political Economy presuppose an 
arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does that by which he may 
obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the 
smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained 
in the existing state of knowledge. (Mill, 2004/1844 p. 110) 
The degree of formalization was certainly not up to present-day set-theoretical 
standards but there can be no doubt that the axiomatic method has been the crucial 
element of theoretical economics since Adam Smith: 
His [Smith’s] method is always the method of Newton, which we have already seen 
applied to psychology and morals: to attain, by generalization, certain simple truths, 
from which it will be possible to reconstruct, synthetically, the world of experience. 
(Halévy, 1960 pp. 100, 494); see also (Hollander, 1977), (Redman, 1993 p. 98) 
This, however, does not imply that Mill’s behavioral axiom is the only or the best point 
of departure or, for that matter, that axiomatization is at all productively applicable to 
human behavior6. With regard to the first concern, the appropriateness of the set of basic 
concepts, Cournot was quite explicit and stupendously clairvoyant: 
The abstract idea of wealth or value in exchange (…) must be carefully 
distinguished from accessory ideas of utility, scarcity and suitability to the needs 
and enjoyment of mankind (…). These ideas are variable, and by nature 
indeterminate and consequently ill suited for the foundation of a scientific theory 
(…). Cournot 1897, quoted in (Mirowski, 1995 p. 208); see also (Ingrao, et al., 
1990 pp. 38, 41, 47, 81) 
The second concern, the applicability of the hypothetico-deductive method to human 
behavior in the economic realm, led around 1890 to the fierce controversy known as 
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Methodenstreit (Hodgson, 2001 pp. 93-94), (Hands, 1993 pp. 39-49, 81), (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971 pp. 325, 342). Although the Historical School had valid arguments it was 
eventually split off from the mainstream whose proponents preferred to look to the 
triumphant physical sciences for methodological inspiration7. Hahn summarized the effect 
of the ensuing conceptual monoculture a century later: 
History dependence stares us in the face (…), but it is not the stuff of pure theory. 
(Hahn, 1991 p. 48) 
The stance taken in this treatise is a pragmatic one. Euclid’s 5th postulate, Hilbert’s 
program, and Gödel’s proof are of no direct concern. Or, to be more specific: Hilbert’s 
'Finitistic Program for the Foundations of Arithmetic' (FPFA) is of no concern outside 
mathematics, yet Hilbert’s 'Axiomatic Approach' (AA) indeed has a bearing on 
theoretical economics (Weintraub, 2002 pp. 72-100); for comments see (Rosser Jr., 2003 
pp. 584-587), (Davidson, 2003 pp. 533-535) 
Hilbert described the axiomatic approach as a fairly general method of research: 
When we assemble the facts of a definite, more-or-less comprehensive field of 
knowledge, we soon notice that these facts are capable of being ordered. This 
ordering always comes about with the help of a certain framework of concepts 
[Fachwerk von Begriffen] (…). The framework of concepts is nothing other than the 
theory of the field of knowledge. (…) If we consider a particular theory more 
closely, we always see that a few distinguished propositions of the field of 
knowledge underlie the construction of the framework of concepts, and these 
propositions then suffice by themselves for the construction, in accordance with 
logical principles, of the entire framework. (…) The procedure of the axiomatic 
method, as it is expressed here, amounts to a deepening of the foundations of the 
individual domains of knowledge – a deepening that is necessary for every edifice 
that one wishes to expand and to build higher while preserving its stability. (Hilbert, 
2005/1918 pp. 1107-1109), original emphasis 
Axiomatization and formalism are closely related but distinct notions8. 
(…) one can axiomatize, without being committed to a formalist reading of the 
axiomatic system. Axiomatization is as old as Euclid, whereas formalism is a much 
later development. (…) Poincaré, the most outstanding mathematician at the turn of 
the twentieth century, while acknowledging the value of axiomatic systems, 
rejected Hilbert’s formalism. Similarly Frege, the leading logician of the period, 
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while rejecting Hilbert’s formalism, extensively used the AA. (Boylan, et al., 2007 
pp. 430, 432) 
So, Hilbert’s FPFA-program did not go unchallenged. As a matter of fact, the 
mathematicians had a fierce Methodenstreit of their own: 
Brower blasted away the formalists. Of course, he said, axiomatic, formalistic 
treatment may avoid contradictions, but nothing of mathematical value will be 
obtained in this way. “An incorrect theory, even if it cannot be rejected by any 
contradiction that would refute it, is nevertheless incorrect, just as a criminal act in 
nonetheless criminal whether or not any court could prevent it.” (…) “To the 
question, where shall mathematical rigor be found, the two parties give different 
answers. The intuitionist says, in the human intellect; the formalist says, on paper.” 
(Kline, 1982 pp. 252-253) 
As a result of the methodological discourse within economics axiomatization has been 
scaled down to a desideratum of proper communication: 
The procedural defense hinges upon an ideal of rigour, which is independent of the 
uses and purposes in which the mathematics is embedded. My favourite advocate of 
this position is Tjalling Koopmans, if only because, for him, mathematical rigour 
was the only thing standing between us and the chaos of shoddy argumentation, 
duplicity and the 'noise' in communication due to human frailty. (Mirowski, 1994 p. 
62) 
This apparent rightsizing of the axiomatic method seems justified in respect of the 
somewhat disappointing results of the state of art formalization of general equilibrium 
theory (Ackerman, 2004); it goes too far indeed because it neglects the constructive 
capacity of axiomatization: 
Formalisation was not to be merely a mechanical check on the integrity of scientific 
reasoning, but through the process of axiomatisation, mathematics was to be an 
engine of discovery. (Weintraub, 1998 p. 1844); see also (Suppes, 1968 p. 653) 
The proper working of this engine is vitally dependent on the coextensive framework of 
concepts. Axiomatization is not exempt from the trivial rule 'garbage in, garbage out' 
(Blatt, 1983 p. 167)9. Hence, it is the predominantly intuitive ensemble of primitive 
concepts that is crucial and not formalization per se (Woo, 1986 p. 66). Admittedly, since 
nobody can see or portray The Economy one has first to rely on concepts and their logical 
relations. And these have to be, in somewhat coarse terms, total and abstract rather than 
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partial and concrete or, in one word, general. And, not to forget, the logical implications 
of the axiom set must have empirical counterparts10. 
It is true, as McCloskey (1994 p. 166) put it: ‘Consistency is not the chief scientific 
virtue’. Logical consistency, whether encapsulated in an axiomatized framework of 
concepts or not, is but a matter of course. The longstanding quarrel about excessive 
formalization in economics (Katzner, 1991) therefore boils down to the 'trite injunction' 
(Baumol) that powerful tools should be applied with a sense of proportion: 
As a personal matter, I have long believed that in dealing with M-Worlds, 
axiomatization is useful as well as safe (…) and I have not changed my mind, even 
though my faith in formalization has been sorely tested (…). My opinion continues 
to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of science, is no better than its user, and 
not all users are skilled. (Clower, 1995 p. 308) 
As a common methodological denominator one can therefore agree upon the following 
conclusion about the approach of standard economics: 
All this suggests that, like geometry, economics is best viewed as a branch of 
mathematics somewhere on the intersection between pure and applied axiomatic 
systems. (Rosenberg, 1994a p. 230) 
With this consensus we come full circle back to where Adam Smith and J. S. Mill 
started, tough with the wrong – behavioral – foot11. Let us resume the main conclusion as 
Cournot’s Unfitness Proposition12: Human behavior is indeterminate and behavioral 
hypotheses, even if utterly plausible, are 'ill suited for the foundation of a scientific 
theory'. A behavioral axiom, therefore, is a methodological oxymoron. 
This gives one a clear-cut choice: 1) Forget about axiomatization and build 
mathematical models instead (Niehans, 1994 pp. 313-317), each conveniently endowed 
with its own basic assumptions. 2) Scale down vacuous theory and rely first on down-to-
earth empirical research (von Neumann, et al., 2007/1944 pp. 4-5)13. 3) Restart with a 
new set of axioms. 
Choosing the first option makes economics a pile of incoherent and inconclusive partial 
models (Morishima, 1984 p. 58) and involves some mild schizophrenia because the 
mathematics used derives its merits straight from being axiomatized. Either way, the 
multiplication of models is a 'good game' (Hicks) but lacking a common formal ground 
the only remaining commonality defining the subject matter is a passepartout tool, the 
calculus of constrained optimization14. The second option produces a relatively small 
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number of historical snapshots that can stand for themselves yet need a theoretical 
framework for generalization (Feyerabend, 2002 p. 27). The third option is at all times 
worth a trial according to J. S. Mill’s principle of proliferation (Feyerabend, 1995 pp. 
139-143)15. 
The goal of the present treatise is to establish a formalism of maximum structural 
simplicity and generality. We start with an axiom set that is free of any behavioral 
specifications and subsequently approach the complexity of the real world by a process of 
consistent differentiation, that is, by applying the method of decreasing abstraction 
(Klant, 1988 p. 90). While progressing from the big picture to the details the coherence of 
whole and parts is maintained at every level of differentiation. It has to be shown that on 
the new axiomatic foundation a general theory in the strict sense can be reconstructed. 
With a minimum expense of words Figure 1 summarizes that the present treatise is 
about the switch of the unifying principle from the behavioral axioms represented by 
homo economicus to structural axioms. 
 Foreground Background 
Standard economics Behavioral axioms − homo 
economicus 
Restrictive structural 
assumptions 
e·Economics General structural axioms Appropriate behavioral 
assumptions 
Figure 1 Switch of the Unifying Principle 
It should therefore cause no great surprise that the terminology used in the following 
necessarily differs to some extent from the subjective-marginalistic terminology. The 
phenomena to be studied, naturally, are the same16. However, since the perspective is 
structure-centric instead of behavior-centric and since the configuration of formal 
premises is entirely new, the following inquiry leads in some relevant cases to new 
insights and conclusions. 
An axiomatic approach provides an array of consistent logical conclusions. It neither 
offers a political philosophy nor a finished proposal how to fix the most pressing 
economic problem, whatever it is at the moment17. As a piece of pure theory the present 
treatise first of all calls for a comparison of the formal conclusions with real world events. 
For this purpose a wide range of rather specific propositions is provided in the following. 
Viner has made the case for axiomatization in one plain sentence: 
To Plato’s question, “Granted that there are means of reasoning from premises to 
conclusions, who has the privilege of choosing the premises?” the correct answer, I 
9 
 
presume, is that anyone has this privilege who wishes to exercise it, but that 
everyone else has the privilege of deciding for himself what significance to attach to 
the conclusions, and that somewhere there lies the responsibility, through the choice 
of the appropriate premises, to see to it that judgment, information, and perhaps 
even faith, hope and charity, wield their due influence on the nature of economic 
thought. (Viner, 1963 p. 12) 
1.2 Implicit World Views 
“Life is short. Nature is niggardly. Our fellows have other objectives “, Robbins (1935 p. 
13) was quite explicit about his ontological stance. It is widely admitted that each 
theoretical endeavor is influenced by the researcher’s implicit world view (Suppe, 1977 
pp. 217-221), (Fleck, 1980/1935 p. 54). These subjective preconceptions turn up as self-
evident characteristics of the natural order (Klant, 1988). Robbins distilled his value-
charged preconception about the human condition into the neutral notions of choice, 
scarcity, and competition. The original meaning of these concepts became further blurred 
with progressive formalization but it is invariably present as a subtext in the economic 
discourse. 
Ontology is educated guesswork about what is truly real or merely accidental or even 
illusory (Mäki, 2001), (Searle, 1995), (Lawson, 1994). Hence the contention that Nature 
is niggardly would not be of any importance were it not for the fact that ontology, 
however trivial18, is crucial for the acceptance or rejection of theories (Mäki, 2001 p. 9). 
Einstein did not come to terms with quantum theory because of his deterministic ontology 
(Atmanspacher, 2002 p. 50) and not because he regarded quantum theory as logically 
deficient. 
Ontology meanders, in interaction with the distinct scientific subfields19, between 
antipodes like: form–substance, being–becoming, determinism–randomness, order–chaos, 
causality–finality, ends–means, indestructibility–degradation, unity–diversity, 
equilibrium–process, atomistic–organistic, quantitative–qualitative, continuous–discrete, 
natural–social, rational–emotional, cooperative–competitive, finite–infinite, perfect 
(Supreme Being)–corrupt (human being), and so on. 
That the ontological profile of standard economics closely resembles that of classical 
physics (Mirowski, 1995), (Ingrao, et al., 1990 pp. 33-37) and is therefore misleading in 
the domain of economics has been an ongoing critique since Walras and Jevons started 
their extensive borrowing from the hard sciences (Cohen, 1994 p. 79). 
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It has been repeatedly suggested that scientists come ontologically in two types: 
Platonists and Heraclitians. The first type is comfortable with stasis and order and sees 
the world basically in equilibrium. The second type likes process and change and sees the 
world in intermittent continuous and discontinuous flux (Waldrop, 1993 pp. 334-335). 
There is, though, somewhat more to ontology than this simplistic binary scheme covers. 
The Durkheim-Mauss-Douglas Thesis asserts: 
Theories of the physical world are shaped by the social relations within the culture 
that generates them, and these are used in turn to express in reified format the 
essence of that culture’s ideal of order. (Mirowski, 1988 p. 110) 
Economics is not outside the sphere of social belief structures. It has often been noticed 
that its persuasive metaphors: progress, individual self-improvement, efficiency, the 
invisible hand, timeless equilibrium, and the Pareto optimum as summum bonum of 
social well-being, are secularized gospels (Nelson, 2006). Depending on their ontology 
economic theories therefore have social merits that are independent of their scientific 
merits (however assessed by the respective thought collective). In a social context 
structured by interests proofs, independently of the degree of abstraction or the original 
intent, sooner or later acquire the double character of scientific and political proofs 
(Clower, 1995 p. 317). The Austrians have always been quite outspoken about this 
ontological nexus: 
In what was perhaps their finest hour, the Austrians (…) argued that this vision of 
market socialism was impossible and that it was based on a fundamentally 
misguided vision of markets and prices. (Rosen, 1997 p. 144) 
It was certainly the finest hour of neoclassical economics and a 'major intellectual 
achievement' (Hahn, 1984 p. 114) when Arrow and Debreu (1954) following Wald 
(1951/1936) proved the existence of a general equilibrium by applying the axiomatic 
method about 80 years after Walras had posed the problem (and incidentally about 280 
years after Spinoza had delivered a work of 'remarkable resemblance' (Morishima, 1984 
p. 51). The social benefits have been considerable: 
(…) general equilibrium theory seems to consign ideological controversy to the 
past; the theory of value is now the province of disinterested research. (Mandler, 
1999 p. 46); see also (Porter, 1994 p. 160) 
This disinterested research (Mas-Colell, et al., 1995 pp. 598-606) accompanied by the 
ever present hunch among economists that general equilibrium theory might be a 'blind 
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alley' (Blaug, 2001 p. 160) or the 'wrong peak' (Kirman, 2006 p. 248) has led to the real 
challenge: 
It is good to have [the technically best study of equilibria], but perhaps the time has 
now come to see whether it can serve in an analysis of how economies behave. The 
most intellectually exciting question of our subject remains: is it true that the pursuit 
of private interest produces not chaos but coherence, and if so, how is it done? 
(Hahn, 1984 p. 102) 
To answer this question research has gone in various directions (Rizvi, 2006 p. 231). 
The present treatise is, in a broad sense, unanimous with the ontological stance and 
concerns of evolutionary economics20. A programmatic definition has been given by Witt: 
Evolution is the self-transformation over time of a system under consideration. In 
this definition, the term 'transformation' means a process of change governed by 
regularities. The prefix in 'self-transformation' points to the endogenous sources and 
causes of novelty. (Witt, 2003 p. 13), original emphasis; for detailed criteria see 
(Nelson, 1995 p. 56); for elaborate evolutionary ontologies see (Dopfer, et al., 
2004), (Vromen, 2001) 
The notion of evolution has different meanings in different contexts. One can sensibly 
speak about the evolution of ideas (Luhmann), of an evolutionary epistemology (Popper) 
or about the evolution of physical laws (Peirce), and, of course, of biological evolution 
(Darwin, Wallace, Lamarck). The term evolution was in wide use long before it acquired 
a pronounced Darwinistic flavor (Hodgson, 1996 pp. 18-21) and its most general 
connotations are: cumulative change, randomness, irreversibility, population variety, self-
organization, autopoiesis, circular causation, increasing complexity and open-endedness. 
Darwinian evolution is far more specific and embraces the inseparable causal interaction 
of variation, replication, and selection (Hodgson, 2002). Social Darwinism, which 
developed at the political fringe, has no logical connection to Darwin’s theory (Hodgson, 
2006 p. 57), (Bannister, 1979). In the most general sense, and apart from rather intricate 
details, evolution is basically an ontological contraposition to mechanics. It would be 
misleading, however, to personalize the two paradigms in the platitudinous antagonism 
Darwin vs. Newton21. For better or worse neither scholars nor paradigms are 
unambiguous entities: 
An amusing point is that Newton was not Newtonian. He, on the contrary, believed 
in an evolving world. The world would go into 'confusion' and the 'agent' (God?) 
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would have to repair it. (Prigogine, 2005 p. 63), original emphasis; see also (Gleick, 
2003 p. 47), (Westfall, 2008 pp. 646-647) 
On the other hand it has been observed: 
In a real sense Darwin produced a theory of proximal cause, evolution by natural 
selection, designed to exorcise the specter of supernatural design. In doing so, he 
moved biology into a Newtonian framework. (Brooks, et al., 1986 p. x); see also 
(Gingerezer, et al., 1997 p. 136), (Bannister, 1979 p. 26)22 
The interlinking explanandum of economics is the phenomenon of accelerated 
'technophysico evolution' (Fogel, 1999 p. 2), (Day, 2008) that goes along with an even 
faster development of the financial sphere. In the present treatise the adjective 
evolutionary23 embraces five specific tenets with regard to the subject matter of 
economics: 
- The money economy is – ontologically – the real economy. 
- The economy operates at the margin of time. 
- The basic systemic characteristics are: change, chance, and variety24. 
- Neither the agent nor the theoretical economist knows that the sun will rise 
tomorrow25. 
- The principle of hierarchical ontological consistency applies. 
This principle demands: 
(…) theories of each ontological level must be consistent with all other theories 
pertaining to that reality, including those at other levels. Although each theory and 
mode of theorizing is different, no theory can overturn an acceptable theory at 
another ontological level. For example, reigning socio-economic principles cannot 
overturn the known and received laws of biology or physics. (…) This meta-
theoretical principle (…) is required to avoid contradictions within a theoretical 
structure. (Hodgson, 2001 p. 328) 
A rather straightforward application of this principle asserts: since the unsurpassable 
speed of light is finite, the speed of economic agent’s action and reaction is even more 
finite; therefore the behavioral assumption of simultaneous mutual adaptation is pointless, 
even in pure as-if models. 
Hierarchical ontological consistency is independent of formal consistency. The opaque 
interaction between advanced formalization and ontology has been elucidated by Woo: 
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By the time a sophisticated logical system is build up, it is no longer easy to relax 
[the] originally instrumental but now ontological assumptions on a one-by-one 
basis, because the relaxed assumptions (even those of a more realist kind), still have 
to be blended into the rest of the system in order to derive new theorems. This, the 
system can hardly escape being contaminated by the unreal ontology unwittingly 
formed in the rest of the system, an ontology that no longer has any conceivable 
counterpart in reality (…). (Woo, 1992 p. 37), original emphasis 
The multilayer ontological underworld is not a harmless virtual reality. It imparts 
legitimacy and it busily manufactures insiders and outsiders26. The ontological stance is 
pre-theoretical but neither neutral nor useless because it implicitly determines the positive 
and negative heuristics of a research program. In economics, the evolution paradigm 
denies the ontological legitimacy of the equilibrium paradigm. 
1.3 Comprehensibility and Compressibility 
Theory has aptly been compared to a map that reduces the overwhelming complexity of 
the real thing to manageable proportions. As a first step to a useful map naïve empiricism 
translates the real thing into commonplace economics (Niehans, 1994 p. 15) which 
asserts: 
– Successive units of a commodity are less and less urgently needed. (…) 
– Abundance makes prices fall a scarcity makes them rise (…). 
– A decline in price stimulates demand but reduces supply (…). 
– Higher fertility and better location result in higher land rent. 
– An increase in the money supply raises prices. 
– Voluntary exchange is advantageous to both parties. 
– Trade occurs because different regions have different natural endowments (…). 
The salient trait of this pre-theoretical raw material is that it reflects a proximal glance 
at a fairly developed economy with prices, rent, and money, which is historically located 
somewhere between a pure barter economy and a globalized economy: 
For the history of economic science, the concept of commonplace economics is 
useful mainly as a benchmark from which analytical achievement can be measured. 
It marks the zero point of scientific progress. (Niehans, 1994 p. 15) 
What we need, then, is a corresponding analytical zero point. The crucial requirement 
thereby is that this point must embrace the whole economy. To insist on this requirement 
is the distinguishing merit of general equilibrium theory in comparison to the Marshallian 
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approach that has to protect its open flanks with ceteris paribus27. This analytical 
expedient is unwarranted because circular interdependencies are the defining 
characteristic of the economy. Therefore no partial approach of any kind will do in the 
long run. Methodologically partial analysis has the serious drawback that it almost 
certainly leads to the fallacy of composition. 
The task is to create a map of the whole economy without firsthand experience because 
The Economy is invisible and intangible. That is, one has to leap from commonplace 
economics to an extremely abstract set of basic propositions about the economy as a 
whole28. This set has to reduce the vast complexity of the real thing to almost nothing. 
From this almost-nothingness the real world complexity then has to be logically 
reconstructed. This requires the cumulative introduction of more specific assumptions and 
historical contingencies. The consequence of which can be made clear with an analogy to 
physics. The law of gravitation enables a fairly good prediction of a cannonball’s 
parabolic trajectory but does not help much with a flying feather that is more exposed to 
the innumerable contingencies of the moment. It is obvious, however, that this kind of 
complexity is altogether independent from the simple general laws of motion. Hence the 
complexities of real life do not a priori preclude the simplicity of theory. Admittedly, 
they severely hamper the straightforward application of the theory in the 'abyss of 
disorder' (Quesnay). For individual practical purposes commonplace economics is 
inductively true and sufficient. By the same token is Aristotle’s commonplace physics 
still empirically valid for all who remain close to the earth’s surface (Feyerabend, 1995 
pp. 176-181) and who do not care about Galileo’s acrimonious refutation of parochial 
realism. Yet, theory aims at generality29. 
It may well turn out, though, that it is impossible to analytically reduce the complexity 
of the whole economy. In this case a faithful description and interpretation of the state of 
affairs by ideal types is the alternative to axiomatization. Whether it is possible to capture 
the essence of a money economy with a few axioms is unknowable in advance yet we 
may find it out with successive trials: 
Whether an axiom is or is not valid can be ascertained either through direct 
experimentation or by verification through the result of observations, or, if such a 
thing is impossible, the correctness of the axiom can be judged through the indirect 
method of verifying the laws which proceed from the axiom by observation or 
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experimentation. (If the axiom is deemed to be incorrect it must be modified or 
instead a correct axiom must be found.) (Morishima, 1984 p. 53) 
Contradicting Morgenstern’s credo 'I believe that it is quite possible to axiomatize 
economics.' (Ingrao, et al., 1990 p. 193), it has been argued more than once that this 
approach is futile in principle: 
(…) theory means a logical filing of all extant knowledge in some particular 
domain such that every known proposition be either contained in the logical 
foundation or deducible from it. That such a filing has the unique merit of affording 
comprehensibility is a leitmotiv inherited from Aristotle. However, hardly any 
attention has been paid to the fact that there can be no comprehensibility without 
the compressibility of extant knowledge into only a relatively few ω-propositions. 
(…) It is then the evolutionary nature of the economic process that precludes a 
grasping of all its relevant aspects by an arithmomorphic scheme, even by a 
dynamic one. (…) Given that the “chemical” doctrine fails to work in the chemical 
domain, it would be foolhardy to count on its success in social sciences, where the 
number of compounds is almost limitless and quality dominates the scene to an 
incomparably greater degree than in the domain of elementary matter. (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971 pp. 322, 330, 327), original emphasis 
True, axiomatization is concerned with the analytical reduction of real world 
complexity. This gargantuan simplification requires, yet is at the same time more than the 
shuffling of a small set of symbols according to the rules of logic. The key words in the 
foregoing quote are all and filling of extant knowledge. It would be foolhardy indeed to 
make such a claim and this is emphatically not what axiomatization is about in the first 
place. To begin with, axiomatization is not primarily concerned with extant knowledge 
but should be seen as an 'engine of discovery' (Weintraub, 1998 p. 1844). The 'problem 
situation' (Popper, 1994 p. 155) is rather defined by non-extant knowledge. Second, it is 
obvious that not all phenomena are compressible and paying heed to the obvious 
physicist completely ignored the feather’s complex trajectory and busied themselves with 
falling apples, cannonballs thrown from a tower and idealized thought experiments30. But 
readily affirming with Cournot’s Unfitness Proposition that human behavior is formally 
incompressible does not entail that all economic phenomena defy axiomatization. 
Georgescu-Roegen himself pointed the way: 
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The more complicated the model and the greater the number of the variables 
involved, the further it moves beyond our mental control, which in social sciences is 
the only possible control. (…) A “simple-minded” model may after all be the more 
enlightening representation of the economic process provided that the economist 
has developed his skill to the point of being able to pick up a few but significant 
elements from the multitude of cluttering facts. The choice of relevant facts is the 
main problem of any science, as Poincaré and Bridgman insisted. (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971 pp. 340-341)31 
With regard to irrelevant complexity axiomatization may therefore alternatively be 
defined as the art of ignorance. 
I mean by this that formalization eliminates provincial and inessential features of 
the way in which a scientific theory has been thought about. (…) Formalization is a 
way of setting off from the forest of implicit assumptions and the surrounding 
thickness of confusion, the ground that is required for the theory being considered. 
(…) In areas of science where great controversy exists about even the most 
elementary concepts, the value of such formalization can be substantial. (Suppes, 
1968 pp. 654-655) 
1.4 Rethinking the Basics 
The goal is to better understand how the economy generates favorable conditions for its 
accelerated self-transformation. The analytical zero point for the quest is given with the 
structural axiom set in sections 2.1 and 2.3. The axioms that contain ten measurable 
variables constitute an evolving consumption economy. The route then leads quite 
lineally towards the general axiomatic model in section 14. Since the axiomatic variables 
are measurable, the logical implications have the format of 'laws of algebra' (Shaik, 1980) 
that have an empirical counterpart. 
The behavioral building block, the propensity function, is introduced in section 2.4. 
This general equation compactifies all logical variants from uncertainty to determinism 
and from it follows the drifting economy as the minimalistic evolutionary benchmark 
process. The market outcomes of the pure random processes are analyzed in section 4 and 
the distinction between stochastic and deterministic supersymmetry on the one hand and 
behavioral equilibrium on the other is exemplified. It is shown that the microeconomic 
details of a behavioral equilibrium or disequilibrium can be readily mapped onto the 
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elementary axiom set. This compactification is then also carried out for an arbitrary 
number of periods. 
In section 5 the development of real and nominal stocks including the quantity of 
money is directly derived from the axiom set. 
Human behavior is epitomized by a new economic man and his multidimensional 
bundle of signum functions. The signum function is introduced in section 6 and first 
applied to analyze the clearing of the product market and the balancing of the household 
sector’s budget with a minimum of behavioral assumptions. The signum function, which 
determines the directionality of the propensity function, is derived as the product of the 
information and the action function. In section 6.1, 6.4, and 6.5 it is demonstrated for the 
product market how directed randomness leads to stochastic stability and optimality in a 
random environment. 
Section 7 is devoted to the introduction of the axioms of profit and saving and the 
consistent derivation of net worth. The substantial conceptual differences with standard 
profit theory are elaborated at length. Standard profit theory needs neither empirical nor 
logical falsification because it is known to be incoherent. What is actually needed is a 
consistent alternative, which is provided by the structural axiom set. 
In section 8 the behavioral and structural interplay is explored in detail in order to 
specify the favorable conditions that are indispensable for the proper functioning of the 
market economy. In this straightforward mechanical analysis the concepts of employment 
multiplier and price multiplier are put to work. It turns out that there exists a significant 
algebraic relation between the employment multiplier and the original Phillips curve. 
The extended axiomatic base is the formal precondition for the logical emergence of 
new markets: the secondary commodity market and the various financial markets that are 
dealt with in section 9. In this context, as in others, we are led to the conclusion that there 
is no such thing as a generic market. 
The distribution of output between the wage earners and the receivers of distributed 
profits and the mechanism of redistribution is analyzed in section 10 together with the 
distribution of profits between firms. It is shown that the distribution of output does not 
depend on a well-behaved production function or on diminishing returns. 
Applying the method of rational reconstruction an account is given in section 11 of how 
the initial economy and the supporting institutions come into being by the rational choice 
of individuals. The analytical aim is to set the development of the economy in motion 
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from initial conditions that are entirely transparent and to oversee without difficulty. Non-
human production factors and an evolutionary analogue to the production function are 
added and then formally compactified, i.e., mapped onto the axiom set. 
With the consistent integration of the labor market in sections 12 the basic two-market 
system is completed and the probability of full employment is formally established. The 
crucial conditions that are conductive to virtuous feedback loops are discussed in section 
12.5. 
In section 13 the formal system is completed and closed. Given the signum functions of 
economic man the question to be addressed is how the reference values of the variables of 
the axiom set can be endogenously determined. Economic man is portrayed as a goal 
setter. Self-interest in a money economy is defined uniformly for the representative 
household and the representative firm with regard to the growth of net worth. The 
Principle of Valuation is expressed as a function that connects the cardinal valuation price 
with net worth, i.e., the stock of money and the valued stock of not yet consumed (not yet 
sold) commodities. All variables follow in direct lineage from the axiom set. No foreign 
entity like utility enters the self-contained formal core. It is all in the axioms. 
The formal differentiation of the axiom set is carried out for an arbitrary number of 
firms in section 14. In this main part the structural value theorem is derived and applied 
first to two firms that produce different consumption goods and then to the central bank 
and the land agency. The harmonic production structure is defined as the perfect 
congruence of the allocation of labor input and the partitioning of consumption 
expenditures between several firms. An important property of the harmonic structure is 
the equality of profit ratios if the average wage rates in two firms are equal. For the 
special case of market clearing and budget balancing in one period the optimal 
partitioning of total expenditures can be formally connected to the marginal rate of 
substitution. The harmonic structure allows for the determination of the rate of interest 
and of the ratio of the lease price for land to the product price. The classical notions of 
factor income and distribution are restated in structural axiomatic terms to clarify 
fundamental differences and to pinpoint the interconnection of productivity differentials, 
institutional settings, choice, and distribution. 
The household sector is differentiated in section 15 and the analysis of the direct lender-
borrower relationship leads to the formal integration of liquidity, time preference, risk, 
and insurance. 
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At germane junctures the formal interfaces to established approaches are highlighted. In 
some cases it can be demonstrated immediately that an established approach is a limiting 
case of the general axiomatic model. For the Keynesian approach this is done at length in 
section 16. The structural axiomatic approach makes it possible to precisely locate the 
conceptual and logical flaws of the Keynesian formalism. The analysis of the investment 
cycle is then carried further in section 17. The focus is on the interrelation of profit and 
the real rate of interest, i.e., on the interrelation of the nominal side and the productivity 
effect of investment. We arrive at the general result that the structural stability of the 
economic system is vitally dependent on prolonged asymmetric growth. 
Section 18 highlights the long term conditions for a thriving market economy in 
structural axiomatic terms. The clues of the previous investigation are resumed and 
brought to the conclusion that there are two invisible hands, the right one giving and the 
left one taking, and that we have in the past mostly felt the right one. 
Section 19 concludes. 
The simulation details of the evolving money economy are gathered and illustrated in 
the appendix. A link for the download of the Excel simulation file is provided in section 
21.1. 
In his famous Science and Method Henri Poincaré gave a felicitous characterization of 
the axiomatic enterprise: 
The essential thing is to learn to reason with the axioms once admitted. Uncle 
Sarcey, who loved to repeat himself, often said that the audience at a theatre 
willingly accepts all the postulates imposed at the start, but that once the curtain has 
gone up it becomes inexorable on the score of logic. Well, it is just the same in 
mathematics. (Poincaré, 2007/1914 p. 136) 
As it happens, it is just the same in economics. 
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22 Notes 
                                                 
 
1
 For different aspects see as a small historical selection: (Stiglitz, 2010), (Akerlof, et 
al., 2009), (Ackerman, 2004), (Kanth, 2004), (Boland, 2003), (Downward, et al., 2002), 
(Chick, et al., 2001), (Backhouse, 1998), (Lawson, 1997), (Perelman, 1996), (Heilbroner, 
et al., 1995), (Mirowski, 1995), (Clower, 1994), (Ormerod, 1994), (Blaug, 1992), 
(Morishima, 1991), (Stiglitz, 1991), (Wiseman, 1991), (Ansari, 1991), (Kirman, 1989), 
(Arouh, 1987), (Minsky, 2008/1986), (O'Driscoll, et al., 1985), (Wiles, et al., 1984), 
(Bell, et al., 1981), (Eichner, 1983), (Harcourt, 1972), (Hunt, et al., 1972), (Kaldor, 1972), 
(Phelps Brown, 1972), (Shackle, 1972), (Ward, 1972), (Worswick, 1972), (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971), (Kornai, 1971), (Boulding, 1970). 
Roughly, the arguments follows these main strands: 
– 'Thousands upon thousands of scholars, as well as thousands of statesmen and men of 
affairs, have contributed their efforts to the attempt to understand the course of events of 
the economic world. And today this field of investigation is being cultivated more 
extensively, than ever before. How is it, then, that in all these years, and with all the 
undoubted talent that has been lavished upon it, the subject of economics has advanced so 
little?' (Schoeffler, 1955 p. 2) 
– 'I am talking about the evident bankruptcy of economic theory which for the second 
time has nothing to say on the questions that, to everyone except economists, appear to be 
most in need of an answer.' (Robinson, 1972 p. 9) 
– 'Now, at any rate, we have an explanation for why the assumptions of economic theory 
about individual action have not been improved, corrected, sharpened, specified, or 
conditioned in ways that would improve the predictive power of the theory. None of these 
things have been done by economists because they cannot be done. The intentional of the 
fundamental explanatory variables of economic theory prohibits such improvement.' 
(Rosenberg, 1992 p. 149); 'The predictive weakness of theories couched in intensional 
vocabulary do not correlate in a manageable way with the vocabulary of other successful 
scientific theories; they do nor divide 'nature at the joints'; (…).' (Rosenberg, 1994a p. 
224), for comments see (Hands, 2001 pp. 334-341) 
– 'Thus many are inclined to blame inappropriate copying of physics for the willingness 
of neoclassicals to tolerate bizarrely unrealistic assumptions and to place everything 
historical, cultural, institutional, and even psychological outside the framework of 
economic analysis.' (Porter, 1994 p. 128) 
– 'None of these scientist-critics aimed to deny the legitimacy of theory, not even in 
political economy. Nor did they commonly denounce a premature use of mathematics. 
They objected, rather, to “loose” theorizing. The precision and rigor of quantitative 
methods were held up as a cure for this looseness.' (Porter, 1994 p. 130) 
– 'Knight lamented that there are many members of the economic profession who are 
"mathematicians first and economists afterwards." The situation since Knight's time has 
become much worse. There are endeavors that now pass for the most desirable kind of 
economic contributions although they are just plain mathematical exercises, not only 
without any economic substance but also without mathematical value. Their authors are 
not something first and something else afterwards; they are neither mathematicians nor 
economists.' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979 p. 317) 
– 'General Equilibrium Theory regarded by many as the summum of the 'grand neo-
classical synthesis' has throughout its development been systematically attacked by a 
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wide variety of critics from many different angles. Yet, curiously, these criticisms have 
been largely ineffective and it would not be unfair to say that this theory still furnishes the 
basic foundations of what many are pleased to call 'mainstream economics'. Indeed such 
theory as is used by practical men to justify their economic recommendations is derived 
from this underlying framework, albeit with unwarranted appendages. There seems to be 
a quiet confidence in the profession that we are moving, if only slowly, towards a more 
scientific basis for economics. (…) Paradoxically many of those who have contributed 
much to the development of general equilibrium theory are less complacent.' (Kirman, 
1989 p. 126) 
– 'Arrow said that neoclassical economics has three “scandals” to resolve: its inability to 
integrate micro- and macroeconomics, its nonincorporation of imperfect competition, and 
its nonincorporation of transaction costs, which are essential both to the theory of money 
and to asset holding theory in general.' (Koo, 2009 p. 295) 
– 'As will become evident, there is more agreement on the defects of orthodox theory than 
there is on what theory is to replace it: but all agreed that the point of the criticism is to 
clear the ground for construction.' (Nell, 1980 p. 1) 
– '(…) if you think you can do better with a non-neoclassical model (…), then you are 
quite welcome to try.' (Boland, 1992 p. 19) 
– 'If one calls those individuals working in the field of microeconomic foundations of 
Keynesian economics Keynesian-economic theorist, then, as Hahn has said, these 
'Keynesians were not much better'.' (Morishima, 1984 p. 57) 
– 'These, then (abstractions, parsimony, axioms, economic determinacy) surely are the 
"Ricardian Vices" to which we are all heirs; it is these that divert and corrupt our 
energies.' (Wiles, 1979 p. 164) 
– 'Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, what we presently possess by way of so-called 
pure economic theory is objectively indistinguishable from what the physicist Richard 
Feynman, in an unflattering sketch of nonsense "science," called "cargo cult science".' 
(Clower, 1994 p. 809) 
– 'We should also like to underline Debreu’s effective reference to Bacon when he says 
that “citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione.” It would be a mistake to lower 
the level of analysis and clarification. The only way possible is a thorough reexamination 
of the theory’s basic hypotheses, i.e., a true paradigmatic revolution.' (Ingrao, et al., 1990 
p. 362), original emphasis 
– 'Gary Becker has suggested that a substantial resistance to the acceptance of new ideas 
by scientists can be explained by two familiar economic concepts. One is the concept of 
specific human capital: the established scholar possesses a valuable capital asset in his 
command over a particular body of knowledge. That capital would be reduced if his 
knowledge were made obsolete by the general acceptance of a new theory. Hence, 
established scholars should, in their own self-interest, attack new theories, possibly even 
more than they do in the absence of joint action. The second concept is risk aversion, 
which leads young scholars to prefer mastery of established theories to seeking radically 
different theories. Scientific innovators, like adventurers in general, are probably not 
averse to risk, but for the mass of scholars in a discipline, risk aversion is a strong basis 
for scientific conservatism.' (Stigler, 1983 p. 538) 
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2
 'Just as one of the great contributions of twentieth-century neoclassical economics was 
to make clear why considerations which they had excluded from their analyses – such as 
information and transactions costs – simply had to be brought into the analysis, so too one 
of the central contributions of game theory has been to make it clear that the 'rational' 
actor model is not only descriptively inaccurate (as earlier economists had charged), but 
internally incomplete and/or inconsistent (…). The hope of game theory that some simple 
version of rationality could lead to well-defined, let alone reasonable, predictions of 
behaviour has been dashed. Game theorists have increasingly relied in their analyses on 
'small' degrees of irrationality, while at the same time showing that the exact nature of the 
equilibrium depends precisely on the nature of these small irrationalities (…). This 
research makes it clear (if it was not already so) that economists must study how 
individuals actually behave, whether that conforms to some economists' preconception of 
rationality or not.' (Stiglitz, 1991 p. 138) 
 
3
 '(…) we may say that the long-lasting success of our categories and the omnipresence 
of a certain point of view is not a sign of excellence or an indication that the truth or part 
of the truth has at last been found. It is, rather, the indication of a failure of reason to find 
suitable alternatives which might be used to transcend an accidental intermediate stage of 
our knowledge.' (Feyerabend, 2004 p. 72), original emphasis 
 
4
 'The often heard rule that concepts are to be defined before they are used in a 
discussion is much too simple minded pre-Hilbertian. The only way to arrive at coherent 
languages is to set up axiomatic systems implicitly defining the basic concepts. 
(Schmiechen, 2009 p. 344) 
 
5
 'As we shall see, general economic equilibrium theory originated and developed in the 
context of a project put forward in varying forms by different scholars to repeat Newton’s 
titanic achievement – i.e., the fulfillment of Galileo’s program for a quantitative 
(mathematical) study of physical processes – in the field of the social sciences.' (Ingrao, 
et al., 1990 pp. 33-34), original emphasis 
 
6
 'Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are 
really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in which science must necessarily 
proceed.' (Mill, 2004/1844 p. 106) 
'In political economy for instance, empirical laws of human nature are tacitly assumed by 
English thinkers, which are calculated only for Great Britain and the United States.' (Mill, 
2006/1843 p. 906) 
 
7
 'A picture of science has developed since the Renaissance, or perhaps more precisely 
since the seventeenth century that was formed entirely by mathematics and physics. 
Philosophers from Bacon and Descartes to Locke and Kant were of the same opinion as 
the physical scientists from Galileo and Newton to Lavoisier and Laplace, that it should 
be the ideal of science to propose mathematically formulated theories that are based on 
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universal laws. Proof and the capacity for exact prediction were considered the yardsticks 
for the quality of a scientific explanation. 
(…) The theoreticians of science prior to 1859 were unable to incorporate history into the 
physical sciences. One could not experiment with it, and one could reconstruct it only by 
indirect inference. How could this be reconciled with the objectivity of science? There 
was no room for history in the classical philosophy of science from the Vienna positivists 
to Hempel-Oppenheim and Nagel. And this was even true for Karl Popper until the end of 
the 1970s. There can be no doubt, as was shown by Ghiselin (…), Mayr (…), and Gould 
(…), that Darwin had founded a new methodology, the methodology of the historical 
sciences.' (Mayr, 1991 pp. 134-135) 
 
8
 'The sense of formalization I shall use in the subsequent discussion is just that of a 
standard set-theoretical formulation.' (Suppes, 1968 p. 653). 
'This tendency to identify mathematics with formalism rather than formulas became all 
the more dominant in the 1930s and 1940s, when general equilibrium theory was 
established as the most prestigious research field in the economic discipline.' (Porter, 
1994 p. 159) 
It is important to note that the present treatise rests on the conviction that economics as 
applied axiomatics may well start above the set-theoretical level. In this sense we 
axiomatize but do not formalize. 
'Thus not all axiomatic theories need to be phrased in terms of set theory but much more 
conveniently and intelligibly rather in terms of some advanced mathematical structures.' 
(Schmiechen, 2009 p. 367) 
'Under the influence of recent mathematical fashion, some authors have developed 
axiomatic formulations of mechanics using set theory. But set theory is not the right 
mathematical tool because it is too general. Consequently, theorems and proofs in this 
approach are inordinately unwieldy.' Hestens, quoted in (Schmiechen, 2009 p. 368) 
 
9
 'Then there are axioms (everyone maximizes his profits; resource allocation is the only 
economic problem): these are not known in other sciences. An axiom (…) is only a 
premise one is not allowed to question, dressed up as something grand. But it is precisely 
the scientist's duty to question everything! Our crime is not that we use a priori 
reasoning, for often we can use nothing else, but that we push the a priori all the way up 
to the axiom. "Axiom" is, of course, a polite but impressive-sounding word for a "sacred 
proposition." The concept gives us the impression that it is worthwhile to erect vast 
superstructures of deduction on virtually no fact, and this has now become a deep-rooted 
tradition.' (Wiles, 1979 p. 163), original emphasis 
To maintain that there is something sacred about axioms is a popular misunderstanding. 
Quite the contrary is true: non-Euclidean geometry is the outcome of challenging Euclid’s 
5th postulate. 
 
10
 General equilibrium theory did not found much acceptance among physicists, 
engineers, and mathematicians because of its lack of empirical content: 
'(…) it was in part because they had been brought up to think even less of theory without 
measurement than of measurement without theory.' (Porter, 1994 p. 161) 
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'Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. (…) But Poincaré was devoutly committed 
to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice that utility is a nonmeasurable 
magnitude. (…) He also wondered about the premises of Walras’s mathematics: It might 
be reasonable, as a first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but 
the assumption of perfect foreknowledge “perhaps requires a certain reserve.”' (Porter, 
1994 p. 154) 
 
11
 'Now the rationality principle, which in the social sciences plays a role somewhat 
analogous to the universal laws of the natural sciences, is false, and if in addition the 
situational models are also false, then both the constituent elements of social theory are 
false.' (Popper, 1994 p. 173) 
 
12
 Cournot is here meant to act as a symbolic representative of a larger and sometimes 
quite radical group:  
'A remarkable discussion has been lately going on in the revues and journals concerning 
the logical method of the science, touching even the question whether there exists such a 
science at all. Attention was drawn to the matter by Mr. T. E. Cliffe Leslie’s remarkable 
article “On the Philosophical Method of Political Economy,” in which he endeavours to 
dissipate the deductive science of Ricardo. Mr. W. T. Thornton’s writings have a 
somewhat similar tendency. (…) Many would be glad if the supposed science collapsed 
altogether, and became a matter of history, like astrology, alchemy, and the occult 
sciences generally. (…) But as regards the fate of the deductive method, I disagree 
altogether with my friend Mr. Leslie; he is in favor of simple deletion; I am for thorough 
reform and reconstruction.' (Jevons, 2006/1911 pp. xv-xvi) 
 
13
 'Next, the empirical background of economic science is definitively inadequate. Our 
knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is incomparably smaller than that 
commanded in physics at the time when the mathematization of that subject was 
achieved. (…) It is due to the combination of the above mentioned circumstances that 
mathematical economics has not achieved very much.' (von Neumann, et al., 2007/1944 
p. 4) 
 
14 
'Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.' (Robbins, 1935 p. 16). 
'This definition, while it is still popular in introductory textbooks, is really a definition 
that reduces all of economics to a particular kind of microeconomics; (…).'(Hands, 2001 
p. 36) 
'Yet, in spite of these methodological triumphs, the subject does not bear all the hallmarks 
of some of the other sciences. Most strikingly, while economists of many persuasions 
may agree about the tools to be employed, there is no agreement about the basic 
economic model for describing the economy: while in many circles, the competitive 
model, with perfectly informed agents, rational consumers and value maximising firms, is 
believed to provide the foundations for understanding both the aggregative behaviour of 
the economy and its components, in other circles, that model is viewed with some 
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circumspection. Evidently, the tools are not strong enough to discriminate among 
fundamentally different hypotheses, or at least not strong enough to overcome differences 
in prior beliefs, beliefs which are often influenced by ideological concerns.' (Stiglitz, 
1991 p. 134) 
In the present treatise the subject matter is delineated by the structural axiom set and the 
propensity function. Constrained optimization is thereby not excluded but regarded as a 
limiting case. 
 
15
 See also Popper’s conjectures and refutations (Popper, 1981 p. 53). 
Mill’s proliferation or Popper’s conjectures differ in substance from the multiplication of 
models: 
'Some fields of economics consist mainly of interesting possibilities. The hundredth 
possible world of international trade theory gives the impression of an allegorical poesy 
gone wacko.' (McCloskey, 1990 p. 31) 
 
16
 'And similarly in economic theory, certain results (…) may be known already. Yet it 
is of interest to derive them again from an exact theory. The same could and should be 
said concerning practically all established economic theorems.' (von Neumann, et al., 
2007/1944 p. 6) 
 
17
 'However much economists may evoke their purity, they want to change the world. 
They want to contribute to the solution of urgent practical problems. (…) Of course, they 
also pursue the consistency of the theories they make, for he who contradicts himself 
proves nothing.' (Klant, 1988 pp. 112-113), original emphasis 
Unfortunately, economists have entangled themselves in an idiosyncratic version of the 
Epimenides paradox. From the behavioral axiom that all rational agents promote their 
self-interest follows that whatever proposal economists make must either be in the self-
interest of economists or irrational. Apart from this logical trap scientific credibility has 
become a major problem. 
'Changing paradigms is not easy. Too many have invested too much in the wrong models. 
Like the Ptolemaic attempts to preserve earth-centric views of the universe, there will be 
heroic efforts to add complexities and refinements to the standard paradigm. The resulting 
models will be an improvement and policies based on them may do better, but they too 
are likely to fail. Nothing less than a paradigm shift will do. But a new paradigm, I 
believe, is within our grasp: the intellectual building blocks are there and the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking is providing a framework for bringing the diverse group of 
scholars striving to create this new paradigm together. What is at stake, of course, is more 
than just the credibility of the economics profession or that of the policymakers who rely 
on their ideas: it is the stability and prosperity of our economies.' (Stiglitz, 2010a) 
About the reliance of policymakers upon the ideas of economists there has always been a 
lot of wishful thinking: 
'Late in life, moreover, he [Napoleon] claimed that he had always believed that if an 
empire were made of granite the ideas of economists, if listened to, would suffice to 
reduce it to dust.' (Viner, 1963 p. 1); see also (Gerschenkron, 1969) 
The credibility of economic advice ultimately rests on the credibility of the basic 
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premises of pure theory: 
'If a professional group regards itself a having a message to deliver to others than its own 
members and makes any public claims in that respect, it thereby gives others the right to 
scrutinize the methods whereby that message was discovered, including the principles, or 
possibly prejudices, followed in choosing premises. They continue to do so. Cunningham 
in 1891 remarked that in the choice of premises “it is not always easy to tell when a 
professor of the dismal science is making a joke” and I suspect that Cunningham meant 
that if the professor was not joking, then he was making a fool of himself.' (Viner, 1963 p. 
12) 
'A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part 
is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain 
certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such 
as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of 
his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him 
for the decision.' (Mill, 2006/1843 p. 950) 
 
18
 'We all have our philosophies, whether or not we are aware of this fact, and our 
philosophies are not worth very much. But the impact of our philosophies upon our 
actions and our lives is often devastating.' (Popper, 1981 p. 33) 
 
19
 'The relation of this reality to the world of appearances forms the subject-matter of all 
departments of true philosophy – of ethics, aesthetics, logic, of the philosophy of history 
and of law and politics, according to the ‘aspect’ of the basic relation that is selected for 
attention.' (Berlin, 1969 p. 56) 
 
20
 For diverse concepts see (Dopfer, et al., 2008), (Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, 2007), 
(North, 2005), (Metcalfe, 2005), (Witt, 2003), (Cantner, et al., 2002), (Hodgson, 1996), 
(Vromen, 1995), (Dosi, et al., 1994), (Faber, et al., 1990), (Anderson, et al., 1988), 
(Hanusch, 1988), (Foster, 1987), (Nelson, et al., 1982), (Boulding, 1978), (Hirshleifer, 
1977), (Veblen, 1961/1898). (Witt, 2008 p. 555) provides a succinct categorization of the 
diverse evolutionary ontologies and heuristics. 
 
21
 There is, to be sure, nothing wrong with mechanics, but only with the comprehension 
of epigones: 
'Thirty years after Laplace wrote this apotheosis of mechanics, something happened that 
tended to prove that mechanics has the power over existence as he described it. In 1846 a 
French astronomer, Urbain Leverrier, at the end of some calculations in which he 
confronted the astronomical observations of the known planets with the results of an 
appropriate mechanical system, was led to proclaim that there existed a still unknown 
planet, which, moreover, must be visible in a certain region of the sky. Direct observation 
of that region soon confirmed the existence of that planet, now called Neptune. 
Neptune, therefore, was discovered not by scanning the firmament with telescope, but "at 
the tip of a pencil." We can very well imagine the dream that this feat must have inspired 
in all social scientists, especially in economists. It is the dream of being able to predict the 
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location of any share on the firmament of the Stock Exchange Market, whether tomorrow 
or one year from now, by solving certain equations that govern the motion of that market. 
Undoubtedly, the essence of that dream must still be nursed in the subconscious of many 
modern economists. The role of such a hope in the founding of the Cowles Commission is 
evidenced by several articles in the early volumes of Econometrica. (Georgescu-Roegen, 
1979 pp. 319-320) 
 
22
 'The concept of natural selection gave Darwin the greatest difficulty. True to the 
principles of mechanistic determinism, which like others of his generation he thought to 
be the essence of science, Darwin rejected Lamarck’s view (…). Darwin’s persistence on 
this point produced finally not simply reinforcement of the mechanistic philosophy, but a 
fundamentally altered concept of order in nature.' (Bannister, 1979 p. 26) 
 
23 The adoption of the Darwinian metaphor is not intended: 
'The role of metaphors in science is not well understood. Indeed the role of metaphors is 
still controversial on its home ground in language. It should be no surprise that when we 
metaphorically or otherwise extend literary metaphor to scientific practice, matters 
become quickly obscure. Darwin’s notion of blind variation and natural selection has 
been one of the most tempting of metaphors in the social sciences. Whether it has been a 
source of fruitful stimulation is debatable.' (Rosenberg, 1994 pp. 407-408), for a more 
general impact of Darwin’s main ideas see (Mayr, 1995) 
 
24
 Variety, diversity, heterogeneity has a biological, cultural, economic, and political 
dimension: 
'Darwin, by contrast, introduced an entirely new way of thinking, when he maintained 
that species are not classes but variable populations composed of uniquely different 
individuals. One can almost say that this view is an upside down version of the axioms of 
essentialism. At this view is an upside down version of the axioms of essentialism. For 
Darwin the real thing in nature was the uniqueness of the individual, while the mean 
value of the population was only an abstraction. For the essentialist on the other hand, the 
idea was the only thing that was real, and variation simply an "error" or "accident."' 
(Mayr, 1991 p. 127) 
'Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck 
out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every 
period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and 
each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to 
travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any 
permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others 
have offered.' (Mill, 1998/1859 p. 85) 
 
25
 'Since the time when Adam Smith’s friend David Hume observed that there was no 
logical justification for the common belief that much of our empirical knowledge was 
based on inductive proof (…), methodologists and philosophers have been plagued with 
what they call the 'Problem of Induction'. The paradigmatic instance of the Problem of 
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Induction is the realization that we cannot provide an inductive proof that 'the sun will 
rise tomorrow'. (…) Several writers have claimed to have solved this famous problem 
(…) – which is quite surprising, since it is impossible to solve.' (Boland, 2003 p. 13) 
'In Adam Smith’s time, inductive generalization was the paradigm of rational thinking; 
Newton’s physics was the paradigm of inductive generalization.' (Boland, 2003 pp. 14, 
15) 
 
26
 'The sneering and name calling and good-guy identifying and horrified-viewing-with-
alarm that characterize methodological discourse fit a program of goodness. We berate 
and banish the criminal, the bad person. The rules of the game give us way of classifying 
scholars as citizens or as thought criminals.' (McCloskey, 1988 p. 249) 
 
27
 In a certain sense all economic analysis is, of course, partial analysis: 
'Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in physics. Rather they are 
provisional in nature. This is expressed by means of the ceteris paribus clause. All factors 
not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed within an argument. This 
clause is used, explicitly or implicitly, throughout economics. The ceteris paribus clause 
is particularly restrictive in those cases where only a narrowly limited issue is analysed, 
such as price formation in a single market. Effects on other markets, and possible 
repercussions, are excluded. Price changes in one market might lead to price changes in 
other markets, however, and these work back on the market under consideration The 
assumption that all other prices are given is certainly wrong here. But the same 
reservation applies also to more comprehensive theories, since these have to presuppose 
data, too, and repercussions of the processes under study on the, data of the analysis 
cannot be excluded, irrespective of how we try to delimit the problem! Economics is 
bound to perform partial analysis rather than total analysis: It considers phenomena in an 
economic system which is only a part of the wider complex and interdependent social 
system, and fixes its demarcations by means of the ceteris paribus clause.' (Schlicht, 1985 
p. 3), original emphasis 
 
28
 'Wer sich mit der Forschung beschäftigt hat, wird schwerlich glauben, daß die 
Entdeckungen nach dem Aristotelischen oder Bacon’schen Schema der Induktion (…) 
zustande kommen. Da wäre ja das Entdecken ein behagliches Handwerk. Die Tatsachen, 
deren Erkenntnis eine Entdeckung vorstellt, werden vielmehr erschaut.' Mach, quoted in 
(Schmiechen, 2009 pp. 197-198) 
'This indicates that any attempt logically to derive the basic concepts and laws of 
mechanics from the ultimate data of experience is doomed to failure. If then it is the case 
that the axiomatic basis of theoretical physics cannot be an inference from experience, but 
must be free invention, have we any hope that we shall find the correct way?' (Einstein, 
1934 pp. 166-167) 
 
29
 '(…) that those who are called practical men require specific experience, and argue 
wholly upwards from particular facts to a general conclusion; while those who are called 
theorists aim at embracing a wider field of experience, and, having argued upwards from 
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particular facts to a general principle including a much wider range than that of the 
question under discussion, then argue downwards from that general principle to a variety 
of specific conclusions.' (Mill, 2004/1844 p. 109) 
'Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either in Political Economy 
or in any other department of the social science, while we look at the facts in the concrete, 
clothed in all the complexity with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavour to 
elicit a general law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there remains 
no other method than the à priori one, or that of “abstract speculation.”' (Mill, 2004/1844 
pp. 113-114) 
 
30
 'The Principia begins with an idealized world, a simple mental construct, a “system” 
of a single mathematical particle and a centrally directed force in a mathematical space. 
Under these idealized conditions, Newton freely develops the mathematical consequences 
of the laws of motion that are the axioms of the Principia. At a later stage, after 
contrasting this ideal world with the world of physics, he will add further conditions to his 
intellectual construct – for example, by introducing a second body that will interact with 
the first one and then exploring further mathematical consequences. (…) In this way he 
can approach by stages nearer and nearer to the condition of the world of experiment and 
observation, introducing bodies of different shapes and composition and finally bodies 
moving in variant types of resistant mediums rather than in free space.' (Cohen, 1994 p. 
77) 
As true epigones the social scientists borrowed a lot from Newton but did not grasp the 
'Newtonian style'. By consequence it cannot be said that Newton's method has failed in 
the social sciences. It has never been applied properly but was soon made redundant by 
Hamilton’s reformulation of rational mechanics (Cohen, 1994 pp. 71-75) .The crucial 
point of the Newtonian style is the undissolvable combination of axiomatics and 
empiricism. Despite heavy borrowing, these essential points never got across: 
'Did anyone ever attempt to found a system of social science or economics on the level of 
identity with Newtonian rational mechanics or the Newtonian system of the world? In my 
research I have never found such an example. (…) In the Newtonian system, furthermore, 
there is no equilibrium, no balancing of contrary forces as in the case of a lever.' (Cohen, 
1994 p. 61) 
 
31
 'Arithmomorphic models, to repeat, are indispensable in economics, no less than in 
other scientific domains. That does not mean also that they can do all there is to be done 
in economics.' (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 p. 341) 
 
32
 '(…) we shall be concerned with a particular, but very important, class of economic 
theories, namely those where the theoretical model consists of a system of (ordinary or 
functional) equations between certain economic variables. A few remarks may be made 
as to the common sense of this type of economic theory. Broadly speaking, we may 
classify such quantitative economic relations in the three groups: 
I. Definitional identities, 
II. Technical relations, 
III. Relations describing economic action. 
